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political parties that nominated them, because they agree with policy or ideology 
of  these parties.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the traditional view, judges make their decisions only on the basis of  
what the law says. As Montesquieu famously said, the judges are “only the mouth 
that pronounces the words of  the law” (Montesquieu 1980, 487). It is quite usual to 
take “judicial argument seriously as one of  the major, if  not the sole determinant 
of  the decisions courts make” (Robertson 2010, 21). We can easily believe that this 
assertion was founded by judges, who did not want to seem to be politicians. How-
ever, the classical approach that only legal arguments are used in judicial decisions 
is no longer a universally accepted conception. Today, “there are probably no po-
litical scientists who would seriously suggest that judgments of  constitutional courts 
can be unambiguously explained by the law” (Annus 2007, 24). The presumption 
of  the politically neutral and impartial decision- making process, in which the moral 
value judgments of  the judges do not have any role, is strongly needed for accepting 
the vast and legally uncontrolled power wielded by the constitutional courts. If  we 
do not share this belief, it is hard to approve that an aristocratic and politically non- 
responsible body may repeal the policy decisions of  the democratically elected rep-
resentatives of  the people on the basis of  general and frequently elusive phrases of  
the constitution. The vision of  the wise and unselfish judges who, taking apart their 
personal attitudes and feelings, always decide solely in behalf  of  the community, is 
a nice idea, as far as it seems to be from reality, at least in contemporary Hungary.
In general, constitutional law applies formal rules to legal institutions for many 
reasons. In the case of  constitutional courts, for example, procedural guarantees, 
incompatibility rules, and other prescriptions are adopted for safeguarding the inde-
pendence, impartiality, and legitimacy of  these bodies, protecting them from exter-
nal and unauthorized interventions of, among other things, politics. This formalism 
is often criticized by many as inadequate in a number of  cases, and imperfect for 
attaining the goals for which it was adopted. These criticisms might sometimes be 
true, but the recent history of  the Hungarian Constitutional Court provides an 
excellent example of  how the destruction of  these formal rules and institutional 
guarantees leads to the decline of  the importance of  a constitutional body, and, 
by this way, how the level of  legal protection of  rights and freedoms erodes. In 
addition, this special case exemplifies the way a strong, effective, and independent 
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counterbalance of  the political power has been successfully neutralized or even 
occupied by a political supermajority in a consolidated democracy.
In any case, the question of  whether the constitutional courts are political or 
strictly legal institutions (i.e., whether they may or may not legitimately use extra-
legal—moral or political—arguments in their decision- making process) cannot be 
decided on a very formal basis, considering only their legal status or regulation, 
which highlights everywhere the independence, political neutrality, and impar-
tiality of  these bodies. Despite the clear legal status of  the constitutional courts, 
there may still be some reasonable doubts as to whether a body can really make its 
decisions solely on legal/constitutional grounds, when its members are elected or 
appointed by politicians among their allies in order to decide the most important 
political controversies without any democratic accountability.
In the literature, there are three major theories of  the decision- making of  con-
stitutional courts, which explain judicial behavior in different ways. Nevertheless, 
very recently, a new approach has emerged, as some scholars try to integrate the 
well- established theories.
The most traditional approach is the legal model, which was dominant for a 
long time. It postulates that judicial decision- making is based on legal reasons and 
considerations. When the court makes a decision, it takes only the facts of  the case 
and the relevant law into account (Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall 2011, 32). The con-
stitutional judges’ activities differ from that of  the elected officials’ who bear politi-
cal responsibility and make public policy. Even if  we place the judiciary in political 
context, the judge still remains different from the legislator or other policy- maker, 
because the judge cannot choose so freely from the alternatives as the politician 
does. Thus, although constitutional interpretation usually provides some room for 
discretion, it is still judicial discretion, not policy- making (Pritchett 1969, 49).
The conventional approach has been sharply questioned by the so-called atti-
tudinal model which openly criticized the “myth” of  objective and impartial judg-
ing. While the well-known legal theories most often discuss normative requirements 
and rules, the ambition of  the attitudinal doctrine is to explain the motifs and 
background of  judicial behavior (Friedman 2005, 258–259). The attitudinal theory 
claims that judicial decisions are determined mostly (or exclusively) by the personal 
attitudes and preferences of  the judges. In fact, judges follow their own policy goals 
(Segal and Spaeth 1993, 69; 2002, 86; Spaeth 2008, 760). The attitudinal model 
strongly relies on empirical surveys, seeking independent variables of  the decisions 
of  the individual judges.
Nevertheless, the convincing empirical evidence of  the effects of  personal 
preferences, attitudes, and ideological inclinations of  judges has not persuaded 
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everybody. The advocates of  the so-called strategic model of  judicial decision- 
making emphasize the importance of  other circumstances which can influence how 
judges decide (Spiller and Gely 2008, 41). Usually, the core thesis is that judges are 
motivated not only by their attitudes but by the fact that they think in a strategic 
way. As they are rational actors, they consider the reactions of  other stakeholders 
to the court’s decisions, and they take into consideration the institutional context 
of  the particular cases. This theory often distinguishes internal factors (e.g., inter-
personal relationships within the bench) and external impacts (e.g., the willingness 
of  other power branches to execute the Court’s rulings) (De Visser 2014, 334–337; 
Vanberg 2005, 14, 175).
Finally, it is worth referring to some new attempts to integrate the traditional 
approaches. The common starting point of  the former ones is that although all 
conventional theories have some explanatory power, none are able to provide a 
comprehensive explanation for the decision- making process of  constitutional tribu-
nals. The typical method of  the integrative theories is that the influencing variables 
are defined at various (micro, meso, and macro) levels,2 and these theories always 
derive the factors affecting the final decision from the concrete institutional, legal, 
and other contexts. In this way, it is the common feature of  these approaches that 
they do not exclude the possibility of  the recognition of  any potential impacts.
In this study, I examine whether political influences can be identified in the 
jurisprudence of  the Hungarian Constitutional Court between 2010 and 2014, 
when the government coalition had a two- thirds majority in Parliament. For this 
purpose, I will analyse systematically the “voting behavior” of  the constitutional 
judges. In particular, I am primarily interested in the significance of  their politi-
cal orientations, as we can draw some conclusions about the political preferences, 
attitudes, and ideologies of  the individual judges if  we compare their views repre-
sented in the Court with the positions of  the political camp which had nominated 
them. In the context of  judicial behavior, the “political orientation” of  the judges 
means their support for particular political ideologies, values and attitudes, and/or 
political organisations. Political orientation is an explanatory variable of  the “polit-
ically biased” judicial decisions or standpoints which embrace all judicial opinions 
or votes that cannot be justified purely by legal arguments, but they reflect—partly 
at least—the personal political preferences or value judgments of  the judges.
First, I describe the basic features of  the Hungarian Constitutional Court as 
it was established at the dawn of  the transition to democracy in the 1980s and 
2. The various authors define these factors in different ways. See for example Dyevre 2010, 317–318; 
Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall 2011, 49–50.
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1990s. Then I will analyse the institutional changes shortly after the overwhelming 
election victory of  the conservative right in 2010, specifying the measures which 
dismantled the guarantees of  the organisational and political independence of  the 
Court. Finally, I will examine the practical effects of  these actions have had so far 
on the behavior of  the judges of  this Court.
I. THE GENESIS AND THE FIRST TWO DECADES 
OF THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Before 1990, constitutional review had no traditions in Hungary. Although a so-
called Council of  Constitutional Law was set up in 1983, it had no power to annul 
unconstitutional statutes. The Constitutional Court was one of  the new institu-
tions established by the constitutional amendment of  1989. During the roundtable 
negotiations, both sides saw it as a guarantee for democracy, and, since then, the 
nomination has always been a complicated political bargaining process.
The distrust of  judges by the communist party- state and the political mistrust 
between the negotiating parties during the transition period led to establishing an 
independent constitutional court with wide- ranging responsibilities. Basically, the 
Court was established on the pattern of  the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Halmai 
2007, 693), establishing a “European” or “Kelsenian” model, that is a centralised 
system of  constitutional review3: the Constitutional Court has exclusionary power 
to examine the constitutionality of  legal acts through abstract judicial review.
The main task of  the Constitutional Court was the ex post judicial review of  
legal rules. Since anybody could submit any statutory act to the Court for review 
(actio popularis), virtually all important laws landed before the body. In certain areas, 
ex ante examination of  the constitutionality of  legal acts (e.g., international trea-
ties) fell also within the competence of  the Court, which was also empowered to 
investigate conflicts between international treaties and the national law. The Court 
decided on individual constitutional complaints too, but in fact, this was an indirect 
judicial review of  the statutes on which the individual judicial decisions were based.
The Court was established as a quasi- judicial organ; though it bore some char-
acteristics of  judicial tribunals (like the structural independence or the irremov-
able status of  the judges), other classical judicial principles and guarantees were 
missing in its procedure (there is no adversarial procedure, for example) (Sólyom 
2001, 114–115; Sólyom and Brunner 2000). The body consisted of  eleven mem-
bers, who were elected by a qualified majority of  Members of  Parliament (MPs). 
3. On the major characteristic of  this model, see Favoreu 1986, 16–31. 
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Parliament elected members of  the Constitutional Court from among learned the-
oretical jurists (university professors or scholars having a doctorate degree from 
the Hungarian Academy of  Sciences) and lawyers with at least twenty years of  
professional experience. They were elected for nine years and could be re- elected 
once. Although there were strict incompatibility rules, the objective of  which was to 
keep party politics separate from the Court,4 the way of  selecting its members (i.e., 
parliamentary nomination and election) brought the body close to party politics; 
actually, during its existence, only two or three judges were all- party candidates, 
while most justices were nominated by the government or the opposition parties.
From 1990 on, the Constitutional Court established a rich and extensive juris-
prudence; virtually, it had dealt with almost all classical issues as is usual in those 
western countries which have much longer constitutional traditions. Undoubtedly, 
the Court reached a pre- eminent position in the Hungarian constitutional system 
and had a great performance in elaborating and standardizing the living constitu-
tional law. It is a commonly shared view among scholars that the Court, in the first 
nine years of  its operation (which period is generally called Sólyom Court after its 
first president) followed a strongly “activist” practice,) relating both to its jurisdic-
tion and to interpretive practice (Halmai 2002, 189–211; Schwartz 2000, 87–108).5 
There is good reason to think that this activism was, to a degree, unavoidable; just 
as every attempt between 1990 and 2011 to make a new constitution proved to be 
unsuccessful, the legislature was not able to resolve certain constitutional conflicts, 
and it failed also to correct or modernize those basic institutions the regulation of  
which demanded a qualified majority in Parliament. Thus, the Court was the only 
institution to have enough power to solve the great constitutional (and, often, po-
litical) conflicts at a time when the institutional setting was paralyzed.6 The Court 
did not hesitate to play this role; since, from the very beginning of  its existence, the 
4. E.g., the members of  the Constitutional Court may not pursue political activities or make political 
statements, and only those can be elected who have not filled leading political or governmental posi-
tions in the former four years. 
5. In Hungarian literature, the term “jurisdictional activism” refers to the efforts of  the Court to 
extend its powers, while “interpretive activism” means the practice that relies on extraconstitutional 
sources in the Court’s reasoning.
6. It is sure, however, that the Court acted as on a sovereign, quasi- lawmaker power in legal areas 
where it could also have grounded its reasoning on a well- established and crystallized body of  law. The 
Court’s conceptual innovations have extended, for example, to criminal procedure and private law, 
stressing that constitutional concepts of  property or guarantees of  criminal law are independent from 
traditional approaches. See e.g. Balogh 2000, 123.
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Court has made clear that the general and abstract concepts of  the Constitution 
are not dead letters but real and living rules, and it is the primary task of  the Court 
to determine and set out the exact content of  these provisions from case to case. 
Although the Court was frequently criticized for its jurisdictional and interpretive 
activism, this conceptual approach soon became widely accepted, at least for two 
reasons. Firstly, all political actors believed that even the considerably revised con-
stitution would only be a transitional one, as its preamble said, “in order to facilitate 
a peaceful political transition to a constitutional state”. The Parliament established 
the new text of  the basic law, “until the country’s new constitution is adopted”. 
Secondly, due to the growing hostility between the rightist and leftist parties, there 
was no real chance for putting the issue of  the new constitution on the political 
agenda, neither was it seen as an exigent political question; the most important 
modifications (which were necessary for Hungary’s accession to the NATO in 1997 
or the European Union in 2004) were adopted, and the activist jurisprudence of  
the Constitutional Court filled the gaps of  the old constitution.
Finally, the behavior of  the Court was basically influenced by the dispute 
resolution approach of  constitutional review, shared by the majority of  the first 
Court. According to this view, the Court should decide all constitutional contro-
versies which were submitted to it, rather than escape from the responsibility of  
the ultimate decision. The Court tenaciously persisted in this view throughout its 
working.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court regarded the Constitution as a holistic 
unity of  principles and rules. This approach paved the way for the concept of  the 
“invisible constitution”, even if  it emerged firstly in a concurring opinion of  the 
first president of  the Court, László Sólyom.7 According to this theory, the invis-
ible constitution embraces all the background or underlying principles that are 
necessary to understand the written constitution and makes a coherent body of  
constitutional law. It is to be noted that in the post- Sólyom era, the Court began 
to change its earlier activism, moving in a self- restraining direction. This image of  
moderate judicial behavior was strengthened as landmark decisions have already 
been taken earlier, and the Court frequently has sought middle- way solutions in 
the remaining hard cases. But the body, even if  in a quiet way, continued its eclec-
tic interpretive practice and largely based its jurisprudence on earlier decisions 
(Szente 2013).
7. Decision No 23/1990. (X. 31.) of  the Constitutional Court, and Sajó 1995. 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES SINCE 2010
The general elections of  2010 brought about a landslide victory for the conservative 
parties that had been in opposition for eight years beforehand. The main govern-
ment party, the Fidesz and its satellite coalition partner, the Christian Democrats, 
owing to the disproportionate election system, gained a two-thirds parliamentary 
majority. Although the question of  a new constitution was not a featured issue in 
the election campaign, the new coalition felt that their election victory provided a 
proper mandate for them to reorganise the whole state, including accepting a new 
basic law. The old constitution was replaced by a new one in the spring of  2011. 
But the new constitution has suffered the great and hardly remediable defect of  
being a partisan constitution, in a sense that the basic rules of  the game were set 
unilaterally by the government majority. The circumstances of  the constitution- 
making process might raise the issue of  legitimacy, even if  the Fundamental Law 
was approved by the two-thirds majority of  the National Assembly, as required by 
the old constitution. Nevertheless, the original constitutional function of  this ma-
jority requirement, namely enforcing a compromise between the government and 
opposition of  the day, could not prevail because the government parties themselves 
were able to provide the formally necessary majority.8
Besides the legitimacy problems, the content of  the Fundamental Law also 
generated huge conflicts in inner politics and heavy criticism in international 
fora. The curious paradox of  the new constitutional regulation on the exercise of  
public power is that, while the state organisation system has changed only mod-
erately, it has had significant political impacts in practice. In general, it can be 
said that the institutional balances of  executive power have considerably weak-
ened: some of  the balances have lost their independence or some of  their control 
powers.
All these defects and problems affected the Constitutional Court, which was 
for two decades the most effective and strongest counterbalance of  the Executive. 
Just a few months after its formation, the new government, based on its two-thirds 
parliamentary majority, transformed the way of  nominating Constitutional Court 
judges, practically introducing partisan elections of  the members of  the Court. 
Until the new regulation, the parliamentary majority and minority had been forced 
to compromise on the new members of  the Court, as the composition of  the par-
liamentary committee responsible for nominating Constitutional Court judges had 
8. It is to be noted also that the opposition parties, with the exception of  the extreme right Jobbik, 
boycotted the parliamentary discussions of  the new constitutional text, saying that they did not want to 
assist in the backsliding of  constitutional democracy.
131
SzeNTe | The Political Orientation of the Members of  the Hungarian Constitutional Court
been based on parity between the government and opposition parties, thus each 
candidate had to gain the support of  both sides. According to the new rules, a par-
liamentary committee, composed in proportion to the members of  the parties rep-
resented in Parliament, propose candidates, who are elected by Parliament with a 
qualified majority of  two-thirds. In this way, the Fidesz government, enjoying such 
a parliamentary majority since autumn of  2010, has been able to appoint solely its 
own people to the Constitutional Court.
Besides all these changes, the number of  consitutional judges was increased 
from eleven to fifteen. Although the explanation of  this measure was to help the 
Court tackle its workload, which was expected to grow in parallel with the Court’s 
new function of  handling constitutional complaints, the measure was really a 
“court packing”, as the government majority exploited the possibility to choose 
the new judges without opposition input. Thus, in 2010, two, and in the spring of  
2011, five more justices were elected by the government party’s MPs, ignoring the 
protest of  the opposition parties.9 In this way, the government managed to place 
its loyal supporters on the Court, who reached a stable majority of  the Court’s 
members. As a matter of  fact, all the nine new judges elected since 2010 were 
chosen by the government majority (see Table 1). This was possible because the 
law on the Constitutional Court contains a “cooling period” of  four years only for 
leading officials of  political parties as well as members of  the government before 
they can be elected as judges to the Constitutional Court, but this incompatibil-
ity rule does not extend to party membership or parliamentary mandate, which 
means that even front- runner party politicians or backbenchers cannot be kept 
from the Court.
This partisan control of  the Court was extended by the new Fundamental Law, 
empowering Parliament to elect the head of  the Court (before that, he or she was 
elected by the justices themselves).10 The president of  the Constitutional Court is 
elected by the Parliament as in some other countries, like Germany; still, this idea 
was strange in the Hungarian context, where the government parties themselves 
may decide who will chair the body without any compulsion to compromise with 
the opposition.
9. One of  the reasons for the protests was that some nominees failed to meet qualification conditions 
set by law. 
10. The political motivations for these changes can be demonstrated by the fact that the changes were 
enacted by modifying the old constitution, that is, not waiting for the effect of  the new Fundamental 
Law. Otherwise, the Constitutional Court, in its old composition, would have been able to decide on 
some politically hot issues, and elect its own president for another three years.
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All these changes badly violated the independence of  the Constitutional Court, 
as the goal of  the special selection method of  judges is just to guarantee the political 
neutrality and legitimacy of  the Court. In contrast, the new regulation provides 
a unilateral and unjustified influence on the composition of  the Constitutional 
Court from the executive branch. From a constitutional point of  view, this is a self- 
contradiction, as one of  the main functions of  the Court should be the control and 
counterbalance of  the executive. The only positive changes were the abolishment 
of  the possibility of  re- election for Constitutional Court judges and the simultane-
ous extension of  the term of  office for judges from nine to twelve years.
Besides these measures, when the Constitutional Court had declared uncon-
stitutional and annulled a law that imposed with retroactive effect a ninety- eight 
percent tax on extreme severance payment, the government majority imme-
diately curtailed the Court’s most important power of  constitutional review.11 
11. The political pressure proved to be partly successful; after repealing two versions of  the retroactive 
legislation introducing ninety- eight percent tax for earlier incomes [Decisions No 184/2010. (X. 28.) 
TABLE 2.  . . . and after July 2010*
Left Consensual Right
andrás bragyova, 
lászló Kiss, 
Miklós lévay 
Péter Paczolay elemér balogh, István Balsai, Mihály Bihari, 
Egon Dienes-Oehm, Imre Juhász, Péter Kovács, 
barnabás lenkovics, Béla Pokol, László Salamon, 
István Stumpf, Péter Szalay, Mária Szívós 
Total
3 1 11
*The members elected after July 2010 are marked in italiscs
TABLE 1.  The division of members of the Court according to the parties nominating 
them before July 2010 . . .*
Left Consensual Right
andrás bragyova, 
andrás Holló, lászló 
Kiss, Miklós lévay 
Péter Paczolay elemér balogh, Péter Kovács, 
barnabás lenkovics, lászló Trócsányi 
Total
4 1 4
*There were two vacant positions when the new government was formed in 2010.
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Since then the Court has only been able to review and annul budgetary laws and 
acts on taxes, duties, pensions, customs or any kind of  financial contributions 
to the state if  they violate the right to life and human dignity; the right to the 
protection of  personal data; freedom of  thought, conscience, and religion; and 
the rights related to Hungarian citizenship. At first sight, this truncation of  the 
Court’s powers was only political revenge for an unfavourable decision, but it 
proved to be part of  a long-term strategy to neutralize the Court’s controlling 
role. One of  the major instruments of  the government coalition’s financial re-
covery programme was to nationalize private pension funds, also expropriating 
their savings. Allegedly, if  this measure was repealed as an unconstitutional one 
(feasible in normal circumstances), the budgetary deficit would jump to about 
seven percent instead of  the three percent that Hungary undertook to keep as 
an EU member.
In spite of  promises that this limitation on the jurisdiction of  the Court would 
be only a short-term solution, it was put in the new Fundamental Law as well, which 
stipulated that this restriction of  the Court’s power will last as long as state debt 
exceeds half  of  the GDP. Although pulling some issues out from judicial review is 
not unprecedented in Europe (Wheare 1966, 102), since constitutional review is an 
institutional guarantee of  the rule of  law, its elimination, even only for a deemed 
transitional period, brings up the assumption that constitutional constraints on the 
executive power can be put aside in economically difficult times.
In addition, the so-called actio popularis (i.e., everybody’s right, even without any 
personal interest, to turn to the Court to review the constitutionality of  a statutory 
act) was abolished, though it had been the most effective tool to launch a judicial 
review procedure in constitutionally controversial cases for a long time.
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has been compensated to a degree for 
the loss of  its fundamental power; the new constitution, on German pattern, in-
troduced the politically neutral institution of  individual constitutional complaint.
The fourth amendment of  the Fundamental Law in March 2013 struck the 
final blow on the Court’s independence, repealing all Constitutional Court rul-
ings prior to the entry into force of  the new Fundamental Law.12 The goal of  the 
and 37/2011. (V. 10.) of  the Constitutional Court] the Court finally approved of  a third law, declaring 
the constitutionality of  the retroactive taxation if  it extends only to the beginning of  the current tax 
year. 
12. It is worth noting here that this constitutional amendment virtually overturned a lot of  decisions 
of  the Court, as it incorporated many things into the constitutional text that had been objected to by 
the Court in its earlier rulings.
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government majority was clear: to compel the Constitutional Court to change its 
jurisprudence, adapting it to the values of  the new majority.13
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES IN HUNGARY
While the formal safeguards for the institutional independence of  constitutional 
tribunals cannot guarantee the political neutrality of  these courts in every case, 
the recent trends in the jurisprudence of  the Hungarian Constitutional Court pro-
vide a good opportunity for studying how the absence or distortion of  these rules 
affect the interpretive practice of  such a court. Notwithstanding, the real political 
attitudes of  judges can hardly be measured with scientific accuracy. Even if  the 
members of  the Constitutional Court have political commitments and prejudices, 
they always deny them vehemently. Despite these obvious problems, the behavior 
of  the judges can exactly be measured through classifying their positions in the 
Court’s rulings, from which strong consequences can be drawn for their motives in 
exercising their high office.
A. Method
To achieve this goal, I made an empirical study examining the correlation between 
the voting behavior of  the judges as the dependent variable and the political view 
of  the political camps (governmental or opposition parties) that nominated the 
judges as the independent (explanatory) variable. In other words, I am interested 
knowing whether the members of  the Constitutional Court meet the probable ex-
pectations of  the parties which supported them in the nomination process. It is to 
be noted that in the Hungarian context, “voting behavior” is not a precise defini-
tion, because, while the Constitutional Court holds official voting on the merit of  
every case before it, the results of  these votes are not public, and those judges who 
did not agree with the majority are not obliged (but are allowed) to prepare a dis-
senting opinion. Thus I reconstruct the judges’ opinions, including concurring and 
dissenting opinions, from the final decisions of  the Court, as published by the Offi-
cial Gazzette. Therefore, whenever I say “voting behavior” of  the judges, I refer to 
their published position which is either confirmatory (joining the majority decision) 
or dissenting (attaching a dissenting opinion to the Court’s ruling).
13. Most of  these changes attracted heavy criticism not only in academic literature (see e.g. Müller 
2011, 7; Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele 2012b, 139–140; Jenne and Mudde 2012, 148, 152), but in 
international organisations (see e.g., Venice Commission) as well.
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If  the quantitative analysis shows a very strong correlation between the voting 
behavior of  the judges and the positions of  their nominators (in the same cases), it 
is enough evidence of  the political orientation of  the judges concerned.
I examined the constitutional review cases between 2010 and 2014, when the 
Court reviewed statutes or other legal acts approved by the new government major-
ity. These rulings were adopted by the Constitutional Court mainly as the result of  
so-called abstract constitutional review, with the exception of  some cases when the 
Court reviewed the constitutionality of  a law in the course of  constitutional com-
plaints. Among these decisions, I took into account only those which were made by 
the full Court and in which the final vote was divided, because only these inform us 
about the ideological, political, or professional cleavages of  the judges. Between the 
summer of  2010 and 2014 a total of  thirty- seven cases met these criteria, of  which 
twenty- nine rulings were made in constitutional review cases while eight decisions 
were taken in constitutional complaint procedures.
The selection of  constitutional review cases has only instrumental function; 
the underlying presumption is that more often than not these have serious political 
implications. If  the constitutional judges really have political preferences and pol-
icy goals, they can pursue them through these procedures. Although the political 
importance of  various laws can be largely different, it is undeniable that most stat-
utes that gave rise to constitutional disputes and were brought to the Court were 
highly important in those turbulent times. Between 2010 and 2014 the government 
majority approved a new constitution (Fundamental Law of  2011) and deeply 
transformed the whole legal system and the market economy. In this period, the 
Constitutional Court reviewed statutory acts regulating the liberty of  conscience 
and the legal status of  churches, the freedom of  the press, the legal definition of  
families, the legal guarantees of  judicial independence, the electoral system, the 
standing orders of  Parliament, and other hot topics of  politics and controversial 
moral questions. Under such circumstances, upholding of  the constitutionality of  
disputed laws, or, conversely, the invalidation of  them, even if  only in formal sense 
through a constitutional review, could have demonstrated the political orientation 
of  the judges—as long as this behavior was permanent and consequent. In fact, 
tendentious behavioral patterns are only proxy variables (Landfried 2006, 229–
230; Spaeth 2008, 760), as the judges—understandably—always deny charges of  
political bias. On this ground, I coded pro- government standpoints with “1”, while 
opposition “votes” were indicated by “0”.
Although the cases examined here amounted only to a part of  all cases with 
which the Court dealt in this period, every constitutional review was taken into 
account, so in this sense, the survey was complete.
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In some cases, I cleaned the data; when the majority annuled some irrelevant 
small details of  a law or when it approved the objective substance of  the legislation 
under review, I counted the case as indicative of  a pro- government viewpoint, pro-
vided that the minority would invalidate the whole law or its essential parts. Fur-
thermore, sometimes those judges are on the same side, writing dissenting opinions 
to the ruling of  the Court, for example, who really occupy extremely different po-
sitions in the particular controversy. The same instrument can be used to different 
purposes. Thus, when some judges may oppose the majority decision arguing for 
the overrule of  a law because of  its alleged unconstitutionality, others might write 
dissenting opinions for the full protection and upholding of  the same legal act. In 
all such cases, the proper classification can be made only by qualitative analysis of  
the reasoning behind the judges’ votes.
The applied methodology may raise some theoretical difficulties; ignoring con-
sensual decisions, for instance, can conceal the judges’ willingness to build com-
promises rather than insisting on a special political stance. To put it differently, 
the unanimously adopted Court rulings can give information about the judges’ 
non- partisan attitudes, as the divided decisions can do for the opposite attitude. 
The high number or proportion of  consensual rulings may be sutiable to prove 
that members of  the Constitutional Court do not form their own judicial opinions 
on political grounds, even if  typical or recurring disagreements can occur.14 But 
it was not the case for constitutional review after 2010. In most of  these rulings, 
there were dissents, so divided voting was typical, unlike consensual voting.15 So it 
is justified to draw the reverse conclusion: those few decisions, which were passed 
unanimously, cannot prove the political neutrality of  the judges.
Another methodological consideration might be whether the constitutional re-
view cases really have political implications from which the political orientation of  
judges can be inferred. To accept the constitutionality of  a law is not the same as to 
support it in political terms.
14. This argument is, however, questionable because even a high proportion of  unanimous decisions 
in itself  would not indicate the political impartiality of  the Court, as the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court cannot exclude the clear-cut or easy cases in which unanimous rulings should be made.
15. In the period under investigation, the Court issued only nine unanimous decisions (17.6% of  all 
cases) of  which seven rulings could be taken account applying the method of  data cleaning (i.e., ex-
cluding the decisions about the same object). The major trends and indicators would have not changed 
significantly even if  we would have calculated the unanimous decisions (in the extreme cases, the 
individual indicator would shift from 0.966 to 0.971 for judge Balsai, from 0.027 to 0.151 for András 
Bragyova, while the change would be minimal even in the case of  the most balanced chief  judge Péter 
Paczolay (0.432 and 0.478, respectively).
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Nevertheless, the adoption of  laws always requires political will behind them. 
In addition, the divided decisions of  the Constitutional Court were made almost al-
ways in cases which have caused sharp political conflicts and confrontation between 
the government and opposition parties. Most of  the legislation has raised serious 
constitutional concerns and has been criticized by a number of  international or-
ganisation like various EU institutions or the Venice Commission of  the Council of  
Europe, on the grounds that these laws brought about different constitutional prob-
lems from restrictions on freedom of  the press and public media to the violation of  
the independence of  the Judiciary.
So the argument is that if  the viewpoints, represented by a judge in a whole se-
ries of  the particular cases which are so extremely different in nature, strongly sup-
port the political side which nominated him, then the only plausible explanation for 
it is the background political orientations of  the individual members of  the Court.
B. Analysis
In the period under review, there were altogether eighteen members of  the Court.16 
Seventy percent of  them were candidates of  the conservative parties, four judges 
were elected after nomination from the left- liberal parties, while only one joined 
the body as a compromise candidate. It is to be noted that, whereas until 2010 the 
candidates had been only loosely linked to the parties nominating them, after the 
change of  government in that year, the new members’ linkages were much more 
direct and revealed. For example, one of  the new judges was a minister in the first 
Orbán government between 1998 and 2002 and an adviser to the Prime Minis-
ter just before his nomination in 2010, while three other new judges were earlier 
MPs of  the conservative coalition. In 2011, for the first time, a politician directly 
replaced his parliamentary mandate with the judicial robes (and another politician 
followed suit in 2012). Moreover, some of  the new members of  the Court had not 
been beckbenchers in their parties but were influential and veteran party politicians 
who were directly involved in the ideological struggles of  the political sphere.
Analysing the voting behavior of  the judges, it is striking what a high propor-
tion is of  those cases in which the judges voted in favor of  the political side that 
had nominated them. The record of  those judges who were nominated (or, after 
16. One of  them, Mihály Bihari, the president of  the Court between 2005 and 2008, for his first man-
date between 1999 and 2008 was nominated by the leftist Hungarian Socialist Party. Another member, 
judge László Trócsányi, in October 2010 became the Minister for Justice of  the Orbán government, so 
his record could not be evaluated throughout this study.
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2010, practically appointed) by the rightist parties, shows that the judges really 
support the conservative government’s policies which emerge in laws reviewed by 
the Court. These members of  the Court usually uphold the constitutionality of  
the newly adopted legislation, whatever its subject- matter is. Table 3 quantifies the 
extent to which the judges nominated by the rightist parties supported the govern-
ment’s policies on a scale where “1” would mean the uphold of  all new legislation, 
while “0” indicates the rate of  denial.
It is clear that the newly elected judges are more loyal to the government’s 
policies, compared to the older ones, upholding the vast majority of  the laws of  the 
new government (see Figure 1). In fact, the three former members of  Parliament 
(MP) unconditionally supported the constitutionality of  all government sponsored 
laws. Actually, if  we take only the judges elected after the conservative political turn 
(with the sole exception of  Mihály Bihari who had been originally a Socialist MP 
and constitutional judge candidate between 1999 and 2008), there is an eighty- one 
percent chance that the new judges (nominated by the new selection system) will 
support the government side, regardless of  the matter in the particular cases.
TABLE 3.  The rate of support for the government’s policies through the 
voting behavior of the judges nominated by the rightist parties
Judges Proportion pro government
István Balsai (30) 0.966
Béla Pokol (34) 0.911
László Salamon (20) 0.9
Mária Szívós (35) 0.885
Egon Dienes-Ohm (35) 0.828
Imre Juhász (17) 0.823
barnabás lenkovics (37) 0.783
Péter Szalay (33) 0.727
elemér balogh (37) 0.432
István Stumpf (36) 0.447
Péter Kovács (36) 0.361
Mihály Bihari (12) 0.25
Judges elected after July 2010 are in italics. The number of decisions in which the 
judge took part are in parentheses.
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Similar tendencies can be observed in the case of  those judges who were nom-
inated by the leftist parties as Table 4 shows. In these cases, the probability that 
the leftist judges will vote against the constitutionality of  any new legal act in the 
future is even higher than the support from rightist- nominated judges: eighty- five 
percent (Figure 2). In all likelihood, the behavior of  these members of  the Court 
was pushed towards a steady opposition by the emergence of  the new generation 
of  conservative- rigthist judges.
The political orientation of  the judges is also spectacular if  we take our com-
plete ranking according to their voting behavior in upholding or rejecting the con-
stitutionality of  the legislation of  the new government in constitutional review cases.
All these results show that most members of  the Constitutional Court follow 
the views of  those political camps which nominated them.
TABLE 4.  The rate of support for the government’s policies through the 
voting behavior of the judges nominated by the leftist parties
Judges Proportion pro government
andrás bragyova (36) 0.027
Miklós lévay (37) 0.135
lászló Kiss (27) 0.222
andrás Holló (18) 0.222
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FIGURE 1  The rate of pro-grovernment votes of the judges elected by the new 
government majority between 2010 and 2013
*For all possible opinions.
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FIGURE 2  The rate of pro-government and opposition opinions of judges nominated by 
left-liberal parties, 2010–2014
TABLE 5.  absolute ranking of the judges according to their voting behavior
Judge Nominating party Proportion pro‑government
istván balsai  Rightist 0.966
béla Pokol  Rightist 0.911
lászló Salamon  Rightist 0.9
Mária Szívós  Rightist 0.885
egon dienes-Ohm  Rightist 0.828
imre Juhász  Rightist 0.823
barnabás lenkovics  Rightist 0.783
Péter Szalay  Rightist 0.727
istván Stumpf  Rightist 0.447
Péter Paczolay  Consensual 0.432
elemér balogh  Rightist 0.432
Péter Kovács  Rightist 0.361
Mihály bihari  Rightist 0.25
andrás Holló  left-liberal 0.222
lászló Kiss  left-liberal 0.222
Miklós lévay  left-liberal 0.135
andrás bragyova  left-liberal 0.027
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It is noteworthy that in case of  some judges there is not a strong correlation 
between their behavior and the viewpoints of  the political side which nominated 
them. It is not surprising as regards the president of  the Court, Péter Paczolay, who 
was a consensual candidate. Two more judges, Elemér Balogh and István Stumpf  
also pursued a balanced behavior, voting alternately for upholding and rejecting 
the constitutionality of  the new laws. However, István Stumpf, who had been a 
front- runner politician during the first Orbán government between 1998 and 2002 
and a political advisor just before his nomination for constitutional judgeship in 
2010, proceeded with a “swing policy”, supporting some emblematic laws of  the 
conservative government and opposing other ideological issues. Furthermore, while 
he voted more frequently against the Fidesz government’s laws in the first two years 
of  his mandate, since then, he has noticeably moved toward the position of  the 
pro- government judges. Even more astonishing is Péter Kovács’s position, since he 
had been nominated by the conservative parties in 2005, but he took a moderate 
opposition line between 2010 and 2014.
In the light of  the above mentioned data, it is not surprising that some strong 
personal “voting coalitions” developed between same-side judges. According to the 
stable political orientations of  the judges, there were some firm covoting relation-
ship on both sides. For example, András Bragyova and László Kiss took a similar 
position in 88.88% of  cases, in which they both participated, while the strongest 
right-wing alliance was formed between Mária Szívós and Péter Szalay (78.78%).
Besides political orientation, it is striking how great a difference there is be-
tween the judicial behavior of  the constitutional judges elected before and after the 
change of  the nomination system in 2010, as Figure 3 demonstrates. Whereas the 
“old” judges, whose election had needed the support of  both the government and 
opposition parties, were much more skeptical about the constitutional conformity 
of  the legislation of  the new government majority, the new members of  the Court, 
who were selected and sent to the body unilaterally by the government parties, 
proved to be much more friendly towards the law- making of  the conservative coa-
lition. But this cleavage between the old and new judges does not refute the deter-
mining effect of  political orientation on the decision- making process of  the Court, 
as the latter’s impact prevails in both groups of  judges.
In the period under review, there was only very moderate collegial congruence 
between the constitutional judges standing on opposing sides of  political orienta-
tion. According to the data, the ideological distance between the judges nominated 
by the leftist or the rightist parties was so great that the chance for collegial con-
sensus was low and continuously decreasing. Although initially the Court was able 
to make some unanimous decisions, after April 2013—when the judges appointed 
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unilaterally by the government parties got a majority in the body—the rate of  
unanimous decisions drastically waned. So the term of  2010−2014 was not a static 
period, but as the Court was getting increasingly packed by the government major-
ity, the rulings of  the Constitutional Court became more and more favourable to 
the Fidesz government.
In contrast, the Constitutional Court showed an extremely strong polarization, 
as the opposing camps showed cohesion. This was due to steady conflict—and likely 
the ideological struggle—between the pro- government and the opposition judges, 
each group of  which pushed the other to more extreme ideological positions.
Overall, the strong political alignment of  the majority of  constitutional judges 
is quite surprising; according to conventional wisdom, most candidate judges nom-
inated to constitutional or higher courts generally tend to be more politically mod-
erate (as it makes it easier for such candidates to be elected), and therefore may be 
more prone to compromise and to speak with one voice in order to preserve the 
Constitutional Court’s prestige and to ensure the implementation of  the decisions 
of  the Court (Sunstein et al. 2006, 83–85; Wesel 2004, 216). However, after 2010—
and especially from April 2013 onwards—the situation was different in Hungary. 
Although it may well be argued that there was a cleavage between the “old” (con-
sensual) and the “new” (unilaterally candidated) constitutional judges for a while, 
the significance of  this presumed division was declining as the Court was dammed 
by the conservative coalition with new judges. As the analysis of  the data reveals, 
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owing to the new, non- consensual selection system of  judges, more partisan con-
servatives got onto the bench after 2010 than beforehand, when the other political 
side, having an absolute veto power in nominating process, had been able to elimi-
nate the unqualified and extreme candidates.
As a result of  the radical change in the composition of  the Constitutional 
Court, and the upset of  the internal balance of  the body, there was simply no 
longer any constraint that would have led the new majority to seek a compromise. 
Thus, the collegial effect, which is so present in other constitutional courts, reduced 
to a minimum in Hungary, if  there was any such effect at all.
It is notable also that the earlier jurisprudence of  the Constitutional Court was 
not so strongly entrenched in the constitutional culture that it could eliminate the 
ideological differences between the judges on that base that if  the law is clear, the 
judges will also agree even if  they have significant differences in their individual 
perceptions and attitudes (Sunstein et al. 2006, 83). As a matter of  fact, the political 
orientation of  the constitutional judges overwrote almost all previous constitutional 
consensus and led to upholding some legal acts and measures which were previ-
ously considered seriously harmful for the rule of  law.
It is important to note that it cannot be deduced from the data that the political 
orientation of  the judges would be the only independent variable influencing their 
personal choices, and in the case of  some judges, even its decisive role has not been 
justified. Since the opinions represented by constitutional judges are not entirely 
consistent with the interests of  the political parties that nominated them, other 
factors must have motivating effects on the judges’ personal decisions. Nevertheless, 
the empirical research presented here cannot be used to assess these impacts and 
their extent.
Even though the aggregate data of  the voting behavior of  the constitutional 
judges provide convincing evidence for the decisive impact of  the political orienta-
tion of  the judges’ opinions, it is advisable to consider whether the data really mea-
sured what was intended; that is, we need to verify that the conclusions are reliable 
and credible. To consider possible doubts also provides an opportunity to carry out 
an in-depth analysis of  this survey results.
Presumably, some scepticism might be raised against the conclusions of  this 
analysis. One objection is whether the fact that there is a great coincidence between 
the judicial opinions of  the individual judges and the political positions represented 
by those parties that promoted them indeed proves that these judges strongly sup-
port political standpoints of  the respective parties. Perhaps this congruence is just 
the result of  specific judicial philosophies with which judges identify themselves. In 
other words, the voting behavior of  the judges, even if  it is very close to the political 
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views of  the government or the opposition side, can be guided by other, non- 
political variables like a special set of  professional values or moral convictions. The 
constitutional arguments are always different from political considerations, even in 
the case where the same subject matter is concerned (Möllers 2011, 317). But this is 
not a satisfactory alternative explanation compared to the independent variable of  
the political background. It is worth noting that in case of  the most judges, there is 
an extremely strong correlation between their voting behavior and the standpoints 
of  the political side that nominated them. If  the constitutional judges would de-
cide solely on the basis of  constitutional text or legal considerations, their opinions 
would not coincide with the political viewpoints of  their nominating parties to such 
a great extent. In reality, two-thirds of  the judges represent almost the same posi-
tions (at an 80% ratio) as their nominating parties, no matter the subject matter or 
the constitutional problem in the individual cases. The battle lines between judges 
are anchored along the same cleavages. No ad hoc coalitions developed between 
them, but there are persistent associations.
Neither a coherent method of  constitutional interpretation nor any particu-
lar judicial philosophy can be recognized from the majority or minority opinions. 
Simply, there is no other convincing explanation for the very strong correlation 
between judges’ voting behavior and the political background of  their election. 
The qualitative analyses of  the mainstream majority and dissenting opinions do not 
show any strong commitment to a well- established legal method (see, for example, 
Halmai 2014). The only detectable organising principle for these groupings was, 
more or less, the origin of  their seat: that is, their political support before and when 
they were elected.
As to the role of  other possible factors and strategic behavior, including in-
stitutional context, dominant public opinion, the clarity of  relevant law, etc., this 
research cannot exclude their effects on the decision- making process of  the Consti-
tutional Court. However, even if  one supposes the influence of  these effects, they 
do not explain the very strong correlation between the judges’ personal opinions 
and the political interests of  their nominating political sides. Perhaps some judges 
read their preferences into the constitutional text in good faith, but this does not 
make their choices less politically biased.
Actually, only the political orientation of  the judges has real explanatory power 
to understand why constitutional judges support the political parties that nomi-
nated them. The explanation is simple: members of  the Court occupy identical 
positions with the parties that nominated them because their political orientation 
is linked to those parties or to their ideology. Similar tendencies were shown by re-
search on other countries, too (see, e.g., Segal and Cover 1989, 557–565; Hönnige 
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2007; Hönnige 2009, 963; Garoupa et al. 2013, 513–534; Garoupa 2010, 46, 48; 
Amaral- Garcia et al. 2009, 381; Franck 2009, 262). The alignment of  judges to 
their nominating party also plausibly explains why political parties considered the 
nomination process of  constitutional judges so important in the past.
Another question is whether the judges represent party interests or whether 
their voting behavior is determined by their personal preferences. In all likelihood 
these motivations cannot be separated from each other, but it is not necessary to 
separate them; the point is that judicial behavior is determined by political reasons, 
rather than legal considerations. For this conclusion, it is enough to prove that the 
political orientations of  the judges have a decisive role in judicial decision- making, 
and it does not really matter why the judges do behave in this way. In fact, political 
orientation seems to be an intermediary concept in the sense that while it may give 
plausible explanation for judicial behavior, it does not reveal the deeper motiva-
tions of  the particular judges (whether they support a political party or movement 
because of  political/ideological commitment, opportunism or for personal gain).
Whatever the reason, the great majority of  judges to a large extent adjust their 
views to those of  their nominating political sides. Nevertheless, there might be an 
alternative explanation of  behavior for the opposition judges. It can be said that 
these judges really do not adapt their opinions to their own political sympathy but 
they merely resisted the demolition of  the rule of  law. This approach relies on 
the assumption that the new government, exploiting its overwhelming majority, 
transformed the whole constitutional system and downgraded the constitutional 
democracy.17 This kind of  argument can be strengthened by the fact that a number 
of  laws that have been reviewed by the Constitutional Court were often criticized 
by international human rights organisations and the institutions of  the European 
Union and the Council of  Europe, which claimed that the laws did not conform 
with the values and principles of  modern European constitutionalism. However, 
even if  this argument can be true to a degree, it does not explain the strong correla-
tion between the voting behavior of  the “opposition judges” and the views of  the 
left- liberal parties which nominated them. Besides, the international actors do not 
develop their own judgments on the basis of  the Hungarian Fundamental Law (as 
Hungarian constitutional judges do), so similar stance of  the leftist judges to these 
international bodies in many debated issues is not a compelling argument for the 
political neutrality of  these members of  the Court.
17. For a more detailed description of  this process in English, see Kovács and Tóth 2011, 183–203; 
Jakab and Sonnevend 2013; Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele 2012a, 2012b, 237–268; Pogány 2013; 
Müller 2011. For an apologetic presentation of  the new Fundamental Law, see Csink et al. 2012.
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CONCLUSION
It is remarkable that in the period of  a two-thirds parliamentary majority, between 
2010 and 2014, when the conservative political camp was able to prepare and 
approve a new constitution and to change the composition of  the Constitutional 
Court, the judicial behavior of  the most constitutional judges was favourable to 
those political parties that had nominated them. In fact, what had been planned 
by the Roosevelt presidency in the 1930s in the United States was achieved by 
the Orbán government in Hungary in this period: court packing by appointing as 
many new judges as necessary to assure the standing support for government policy. 
This effort proved to be successful as most constitutional judges’ votes coincided to 
a great extent with the political views of  their nominators, regardless of  the partic-
ular constitutional problem or the subject matter of  the case under investigation by 
the Court. There were only three judges of  the seventeen, who voted alternately for 
and against the constitutionality of  laws adopted by the new government majority 
after the spring of  2010. Consequently, political orientation played a decisive role in 
the judicial behavior of  all judges nominated by the leftist or liberal parties and of  
almost all former conservative candidates. This is the only convincing and plausible 
explanation for the strong correlation described above. Accordingly, constitutional 
judges vote more or less consistently for their nominating (left- liberal or conserva-
tive) political side because they tend to agree with their policy goals and/or ideol-
ogy. It does not exclude, but rather, in an indirect way, confirms, that besides the 
personal political orientation and preferences of  the judges, there are some other 
factors and circumstances that influence their judicial behavior. So the attitudinal 
model (see the Introduction), even though it has persuasive power, does not provide 
a sufficient explanation for judicial behavior. However, this empirical research was 
not able to identify other relevant explanatory variables or assess their real impact 
on the decison- making of  the Constitutional Court.
But it is sure that when members of  the Constitutional Court, who are the ul-
timate arbiters of  the most important political controversies, are selected by the po-
litical parties for political reasons, the personal choices of  the constitutional judges 
will always be largely influenced by politics, whether that means the judges’ own 
political preferences or the interests of  the political actors who sent them to that 
body.
Certainly, we could say ironically that a partisan constitution deserves a parti-
san guardian—that is, a constitutional court with politically biased members—but 
it would be as sad as it is ironic. The recent trends in Hungarian constitutional de-
velopment—the step-by-step limitation of  the power of  the Constitutional Court, 
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the openly political selection of  its members, and, most of  all, the recent trends 
towards politically motivated jurisprudence—can legitimately raise the question of  
what should be the way of  constitutional review in the future, or, put it even more 
clearly, of  whether it is worth preserving the Constitutional Court or accepting that 
this institution proved to be unsuccessful in Hungary.
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